Specification · Markdown source · Edit on GitHub · CC0 1.0

VRP x402 Payment Binding — v0.2 DRAFT

Status: DRAFT — NOT NORMATIVE. This document proposes the concrete binding for the booking.payment_options[] slot reserved in v0.1.md §5.2. Until the activation criteria in §2 are met, a node MUST NOT publish payment_options — this draft strengthens v0.1's "a node SHOULD omit it" to a MUST NOT for the reserved-and-unactivated window — and an agent MUST NOT treat its presence as a defined, honorable payment path, the latter exactly as v0.1 specifies. Nothing in this draft weakens v0.1.

The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, and MAY are interpreted as in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174 when capitalized.

1. Why now

v0.1 §5.2 reserved the slot until "a winning rail and a non-US settlement path exist." Both conditions have since moved:

What has NOT yet been demonstrated is live settlement to a real host node. Hence: draft, with activation criteria.

2. Activation criteria

This binding becomes eligible for normative status (v0.2) only when ALL hold:

  1. At least one live node has received an on-chain x402 settlement for a real stay, to the host's own wallet, verified end to end.
  2. A facilitator path (hosted or self-hosted) is confirmed available to the node's jurisdiction under terms compatible with public documentation.
  3. The reference verifier validates the §5 receipt binding against live bytes.

3. The payment_options[] entry (proposed shape)

{
  "rail": "x402",
  "x402_version": 2,
  "scheme": "exact",
  "network": "eip155:8453",
  "asset": "0x…",
  "asset_eip712": { "name": "EURC", "version": "2" },
  "pay_to": "0x…",
  "amount_atomic": "1430000000",
  "currency": "EURC",
  "offer_binding": "sha256-jws"
}

4. Offer-hash binding (the chain that makes the chain)

Without binding, a payment and an offer are only narratively linked. The binding rule:

Consequences, both intended:

  1. The on-chain authorization is cryptographically bound to exactly one signed offer — the signature the payer's wallet produces covers the nonce, so no post-hoc relabeling can attach the payment to a different offer.
  2. EIP-3009 contracts reject nonce reuse per payer, so one offer settles at most once per payer — replay of a paid offer fails on-chain, at the asset contract, with no protocol machinery.

Rejected alternative: carrying offer_hash in an unsigned x402 payload extension field. The EIP-3009 signature does not cover extension fields, so the binding would be assertable but not cryptographic.

Offer-request freshness (agent-supplied nonce echoed inside the signed offer) is a complementary, separately scoped proposal and is NOT part of this binding; valid_until remains the freshness bound (v0.1 §6).

5. Receipt attestation (layer: "payment")

Receipt v1's open layer vocabulary already admits payment (receipt-v1.md §3) — no envelope change. The x402 profile of that layer asserts:

{
  "layer": "payment",
  "valid_from": "…",
  "valid_until": "…",
  "ref": "0x<settlement transaction hash>",
  "signature": "<compact JWS over the assertion below>"
}

The signed assertion MUST include: offer_hash, tx_hash, network, payer, pay_to, amount_atomic, asset. A profile-aware verifier MUST check: offer_hash matches the receipt's offer-layer JWS bytes; pay_to and amount_atomic match the signed offer's payment_options entry; and, when chain access is available, that tx_hash is a finalized transfer matching all of the above. Per-attestation status stays four-valued (verified|expired|unverifiable|invalid) — chain-unreachable yields unverifiable, never a fabricated pass.

6. Out of scope for v0.2