Documentation · Markdown source · Edit on GitHub · CC0 1.0

ADR 0009: Host-Owned Domain and Offer Binding

Status: Proposed Date: 2026-10-17 (proposed)

Context

VRP's claim is that a stay offer is real because the host's own domain signed it (ADR 0002). On main at 7a05d24, spec/v0.1.md left that claim open in these places:

  1. "Host-owned" was undefined. §2 required canonical_domain to "match the host-owned domain being verified" but never said what a host-owned domain is. A name that a platform hands out under its own domain could be read as one. The Public Suffix List shows why a rule must say which part of the list counts: its PRIVATE section (read 2026-10-17, lines 11247–16571) lists domains under which a company hands out names to its customers, site builders and hosting platforms among them (for example myshopify.com, wixsite.com, webflow.io, github.io, vercel.app, netlify.app). A rule based on the whole list would accept those customers' names as their own domains.
  2. Brand and closed top-level domains. The ICANN section also holds top-level domains run by one company for its own business. booking and hotels (registry operator Booking.com B.V., PSL lines 7305–7307 and 8589–8591), amazon and google are among them. Under such a top-level domain every name belongs to its operator, so a rule based on the ICANN section alone would accept villa.booking. ICANN's gTLD list (https://www.icann.org/resources/registries/gtlds/v2/gtlds.json, read 2026-10-17) marks 369 brand top-level domains with "specification13": true, amazon and google among them, but not booking or hotels. ICANN publishes no single machine-readable list of the other closed top-level domains; their Code of Conduct exemptions are separate documents per domain.
  3. The booking URL could leave the node. §5.1 allowed direct_booking_url on "a subdomain of that registrable domain" (since 2026-06-08, ce91e25). When canonical_domain is itself a name under a shared domain, its registrable domain is the platform's, so every other customer's name passed. A separate clause named one operator and stopped that one case only. Userinfo and a non-default port were not addressed.
  4. The node's own URLs were not bound. jwks_url and verified_stay_offer_endpoint had to "point to the host-domain" resource, a phrase with no test, and nothing said what "fetched from" means when a fetch is redirected.
  5. The offer was not bound to its domain. §2 bound the discovery document to the fetched domain, and §5.1 bound the booking URL to the offer's *own* canonical_domain, but no rule bound the signed offer to the domain it was fetched from. The node at one domain could sign an offer naming another domain, with a booking URL on that other domain; fetched from the signing node, it met all eleven conditions of §7, and an agent could present it as the other domain's official offer.
  6. §7 had no keywords. It said "may quote … only when". That is normative text in plain English (RFC 8174 §2), but §1.1 now declares BCP 14 and the conditions are clearer in capitals.
  7. The site verifiers (verify.html, verify-receipt.html) checked none of the domain rules, so an offer or a receipt from a platform-issued name could be shown as verified there. verify.html never read the discovery document, and both pages tried a key other than the one named when the JWS header carried no kid (verify.html also when the kid was unknown).

The IETF draft ietf/draft-abbas-vrp-offer-verification-00 has the same wording (lines 173, 213 and 453 of the .txt).

Decision

D1. Host-owned domain (§2). canonical_domain MUST (1) be lowercase ASCII, with internationalized labels in A-label form and no trailing dot; (2) equal its own registrable domain as computed by the Public Suffix List algorithm using only the ICANN section, each rule compared in A-label form, with the default rule * where no ICANN rule matches; and (3) not be under a brand or closed top-level domain: one marked "specification13": true in ICANN's gTLD list, or one named in §2, which today names booking and hotels. That list changes only by ADR. The PRIVATE section does not count. A name under a platform, catalog, marketplace, OTA, site builder or operator domain is never a canonical_domain, whoever operates that domain. A verifier that holds no copy of either list treats the node as unknown.

D2. Node URL and fetching (§2). A node URL is an absolute https URL whose host is canonical_domain or www. followed by it, with no userinfo and no port other than the https default. jwks_url and verified_stay_offer_endpoint are node URLs. "Fetched from" is the host of the URL the verifier requested; a verifier follows a redirect only to a node URL and treats anything else as unknown.

D3. Offer binding (§7). The discovery document's canonical_domain is the domain it was fetched from, and the signed payload's canonical_domain is the domain the discovery document was fetched from. A valid signature over an offer that names another domain is not that domain's offer.

D4. Booking URL (§5.1). direct_booking_url is a node URL of the offer's canonical_domain. The registrable-domain wording and the clause naming one operator are replaced by this general rule.

D5. §7 in BCP 14 form. "An agent MUST NOT quote … unless all of the following are true", with the binding as its own condition; §8 lists the binding among what must be verified.

D6. Before 1.0 (GOVERNANCE.md §5). GOVERNANCE.md §5 gains a paragraph: while VRP is below 1.0, a correction that closes a security gap may be made within the current draft version without changing protocol_version, with an ADR that states the gap, what stops being accepted, which known nodes are affected and the migration path. Semantic versioning reserves major version zero for initial development ("Anything MAY change at any time", semver 2.0.0 item 4). Under GOVERNANCE.md §12 this amendment is itself substantive, and this record is its ADR.

D7. Conformance vectors and the site verifiers. examples/conformance/host-domain/vectors.v0.1.json (53 cases in five groups, three with real Ed25519 signatures), checked by scripts/verify-host-domain.mjs in npm test. verify.html and verify-receipt.html fetch both lists live from their publishers (both serve Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) and show "unknown" when a list cannot be fetched. Both pages follow no redirect from a node: a browser cannot see where a redirect points, so a redirect is "unknown". Both select the key only by the kid in the JWS header (§3.1).

The pages were checked in a browser during review, with every request answered locally; the cases are listed in the pull request. That browser test is not part of this repository or of npm test.

Consequences